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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a case filed by plaintiff on her own behalf and
as the administratrix of her husband's estate, against the
defendant, (1) asserting rights as to certain monies disposed of
by decedent prior to his death which were taken from a bank
account(Ex.5P) held, at the time of closing the account,in the
joint names of the decedent, the plaintiff and the defendant;
and (2) to award one savings account(Ex. 7P) and two savings

-2certificates(Ex.3P and 4P) to plaintiff even though held in
joint naoes of decedent and defendant.

DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
The case was tried without a jury and the judgment was
rendered in several parts.

The Court rendered judgment in favo:

of the plaintiff in her own right against defendant for the sum
of $4,924.66 holding that such sum represented plaintiff's sharE
as a tenant in common in the bank account(Ex.SP) closed by
decedent prior to his death. (R.97-98)

The Court further orderec

defendant to pay the personal representative of Etta \Jood (a
non-party) the sum of $10,000.00 representing the latter's
contribution to such

The Court furthe:

ordered defendant to pay to the personal representative of the
estate of Etta Wood, all oonies on deposit in a money market
certificate at American Savings and Loan Association(Ex.4P), anc
all monies on deposit in a money market certificate at
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan
The court further held that
defendant was entitled to the monies held in the American
Savings and Loan Association savings passbook(Ex.7P) (R.93,23).

RELIEF SOUGHT OU APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant seeks an order reversing the Judgment and orders found in the Judgoent

c'l.

the Court as a oatter

-3of law, cind awarding defendant the amounts held in the money
market certificates(Ex.3P and 4P).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is the surviving wife of Milton J. Hiltsley
(hereinafter decedent) who died on August 26, 1981.

Plaintiff

was appointed the personal representative of decedent's estate
on October 7, 1981.

Plaintiff brought this action in her

representative capacity as personal representative, and on her
own behalf making claim against the defendant of fraud,
alienation of affections , undue influence, and for diversion by
defendant of assets in which plaintiff had an interest as the
wife of deceased or his personal representative. (R.3-5).
Decedent was a Pastor of the Baptist faith, ministering
in Salt Lake City, Utah for 20 years prior to his death, first
at the Bethel Baptist Church for three years and then the First
Baptist Church of Holladay for the last seventeen years (R.149).
The decedent, the

plaintiff and the defendant had a

close, continuous and friendly relationship as friends,
neighbors and church associates.

For the past 20 years,

defendant had been an active member of the churches over which
decedent ministered, and served as clerk or secretary of the
First Baptist Church of Holladay, and was one of its
incorporators.

(R. 87, Findings U-4).

Plaintiff and decedent were neighbors of the defendant,
they visited and ate in each others homes together frequently,
traveled together, shared a garden and worked together to keep
the church going.

(R.87-88, Findings

Defendant made donations to deceased directly and
deceased paid various expenses for defendant over the years.
(R.88, Findings t6)

Defendant did ironing for decedent, cut

hair and made gifts to the decedent and plaintiff (R.432-434).
The parties were such close friends that they even slev
in the same room together while traveling.

(R.195-196).

At the time of decedent's death, the passbook
account(Ex. 7P), and the two money oarket certificates (Ex. 3P ar..
4P) were held in the joint names of M.J. Hiltsley (decedent) R
Hallalene (or H.M.) Ryder (defendant).
The plaintiff had made no deposit to or withdrawal fro[,
these certificates and passbook account, and had n0 knowledge u:
them until shortly after decedent's death when she found them i
the home, in a hollowed-out place under the fireplace in the
study.

(R.57-61, and 185-186).
LEGAL ARGUME!lT
POINT I.

THE COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF THE ESTATE OF ETTA WOOD, A NON-PARTY.

-5The judgQent of the trial court is that neither plaintiff nor defendant is entitled to the monies represented or
evidenced by the money market certificates in American Savings
and Loan Association #ll-013277-9(Ex.4P) and Prudential Federal
Savings and Loan Association #003-300,1723-l(Ex.3P) and that the
monies in those two accounts, plus an additional $10,000.00 used
by the decedent as his contribution to the down payment on the
condominium purchased by the defendant and the decedent in their
joint names with rights of survivorship, should be awarded and
paid over to Etta Wood(R.98-99).
the decedent who predeceased him).

(Etta Wood was the sister of
Said portions of the

Judgment order the defendant to pay sums to Etta Woods' personal
representative.

Etta Wood was not, nor was her personal

representative, a party to the action.

No summons or conplaint

was ever served upon her or her personal representative, nor
were any pleadings or claims at trial made by either litigant
for or against Etta Wood or her estate.
A.

Judgment May Not be Rendered in Favor of a Non-Party
to the Litigation.

It is an eleoentary common law principle that a judgment
may not be rendered in favor of one not a party to the action or
proceeding.

See 49 C.J.S. Judgments, §28, pp. 68-71; 46 Am Jur

2d, Judgments, §86; Houser v. Smith, et al, 19 U. 150, 56
P.683(1889); In re Pingrees Estate, 82 U. 437, 25 P. 2d 937, 90
ALR. 96 (1933); Tanner v. Provo Reserver Co., 99 U. 158, 103 P.

-62d 134 (1940); McDonnell v. Southern Pacific Company, et al., '
Ariz. 10, 281 P. 2d 792 (1955); Fazzi v. Peters, 440 P. 2d 242,
68 Cal. Reptr. 170, 68 C. 2d 590 (1968); Ex-parte Wren, 308 P.
2d 329, 48 C. 2d 159; Hurt v. Jones, 304 P. 2d 786, 147 C.A. 2d
164 (1957); In re Ferrero's Estate, 298 P. 2d 604, 142 C.A. 2d
473 (1956); Hutchinson v. California Trust Co. 111 P. 2d 401, 4:
C.A. 2d 571 (1941); Greco v. Foster, 268 P. 2d 215,

(Okla 1954);

Anita Ditch Co. vs. Turner, 389 P. 2d 1018 (Wyo 1964); Ridley

1.

Vander Boez!!, 511 P. 2d 273, 95 Ida 456 (1973); Windsor v.
Powell, 497 P. 2d 292, 209 Kan. 292 (1972);Williams v. City of
Valdez, 603 P, 2d 483, appeal after removed 624 P. 2d 820
(1979); and United States

'l.

Union P.R. Co., 98 US 569, 24 L Ee'

143.
The law in Utah is in agreement with this principle.

A'

early as 1889 in the case of Houser v. Smith, supra, our
Court considered the question of whether the trial court had
right to dispose of and adjudicate property rights of persons
who were not parties to the case but strangers to the record.
In that case, plaintiff sought to quiet title and recover
possession of land pursuant to a decree entered in an earlier,
but different action, wherein defendants Morgan and Carlston
were not parties.
The trial court held that title was still in t!organ,
that the earlier decree declaring the Smith to Morgan deed and
the Morgan to Carlston mortgage void, was itself of no force o:

-7effect because Morgan and Carlston were not parties to the suit
where such rights were litigated.

In affirming, the Utah

Supreme Court said:
The defendants Horgan and Carlston were
strangers to the proceeding under which the decree
was obtained.
The property was wrongfully and
illegally decreed to belong to another party,
without the owners being made parties to the action,
or having any opportunity to be heard in Court to
defend the title thereto.

*

*

*

On the face of the record as shown, the decree
in the case of Soith against Smith, insofar as it
declares said deed and mortgage void, is wholly and
absolutely void, and was rendered without jurisdiction
over the persons or property of said Morgan and
Carlston.
It is not a question of collateral attack
upon the judgment. The record presents a case where
the judgment is shown to be absolutely void, and rendered against persons who were not before the court,
and over whom the court had no jurisdiction.
Courts
have no ri ht to dis ose of and ad'udicate u
property
ts o persons who are not parties to the
case, and w o are total strangers to the record.
Van
Fleet, Coll. attach, §16,494; Mosby v. Gisborn, 54
Pac. 121, 17
(Emphasis added)
The same principal was again applied in the case of
Tanner v. Provo Reservor Co., supra, wherein the court stated at
page 135 of the opinion,
The Power Company is not a party to this suit
but it was a party to No. 2888 Civil and is bound
by that Decree .... A decree in this suit cannot
alter the rights and duties of the Power Company or
bind it in any way whatever. (Emphasis added).
In the case of McDonnell v. Southern Pacific Company,
supra, the trial court, in an action to quiet title to real
property, rendered judgment finding a non-party to be the owner

-8in fee simple.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona

reversed, stating:
A court has no jurisdiction to render a judgment
in favor of one not a party to the suit. 30 Am Jur,
Judgments §35; 49 C.J.S., Judgments §28; Bachman v.
Sepulveda, 39 Cal. 688; Dunlap v. Southerlin, 63 Tex.
38; Maurer v. International Re Insurance Cor . ,
Del.,
5 A.
7. Parties cannot e roug t into
court and a valid judgment rendered for or against
them by merely including them in the judgment.
As
was well said in Dunlap v. Southerlin, supra;
Courts have no more power, until their
action is called into exercise bv some kind
of pleading to render a judgment' in favor of
any person than they have to render judgment
against a person until he has been brought
within the jurisdiction of the court in some
method recognized by law as sufficient; ...
In the case of Hutchinson v. California Trust Company,
supra, the plaintiff sued the special administrator of his
deceased wife's estate to have determined the ownership of a
bank account.

The plaintiff sought a declaration that the mone·

in the account was conununity property, not the deceased's
separate property.
The trial court determined that the bank account was a
gift to the deceased wife, therefore not community property, ar
ordered the account to be distributed equally between the sons
of the plaintiff and deceased wife according to an agreement
executed prior to probate.
In refersing the holding of the trial court, the
appellate court stated, at page 403:
An additional reason for holding that the court erred

-9-

In addition to the above, a review of Rule 19(b) Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure shows the error of the trial court in
this matter.
(b) Effect of failure to join. When persons
who are not indispensable, but who ought to be parties
if complete relief is to be accorded between those
already parties, have not been made parties and are
subject to the jurisdiction of the court as to service
of process, the court shall order them summoned to
appear in the action.
The court in its discretion
may proceed in the action without making such persons
parties, if its jurisdiction over them can be
acquired only by their consent or voluntary appearance;
but the judgment rendered therein does not affect
the rights or liabilities of absent persons. (Emphasis
added)
B.

Trial Courts' Findings that Decedent Held Thirty
Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) in Trust for Etta
Wood Based upon Insufficient Evidence and Manifest
Speculation.

The trial court's judgment, ordering defendant-appellant
to pay the personal representative of Etta Wood the sum of
$10,000.00 representing funds withdrawn from a passbook
account(ex.SP) and used by the decedent in the down payment on
the purchase of the condominium of the defendant, and further
ordering the defendant-appellant to pay over to the personal
representative of the estate of Etta Wood all sums on deposit in

-10certificate 1111-013277-9 at Ar:lerican Savings and Loan(Ex. 4P) ar.
all sums in certificate #003-300723-6 at Prudential Federal
Savings and Loan(Ex.3P) was based upon the finding of the trial
court set forth in paragraph 24 of the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law(R.94) as follows:
It seems clear the decedent must be considered
as having received the $30,000.00 from Etta Wood in
trust for her and this money was not his money to
invest as he did and did not become his upon her
death to give away or use for his own purposes.
The sum total of all the evidence submitted to the couc·
on this matter is represented by certain statements made by the
defendant on cross-examination and certain entries contained in
the ledger, Exhibit 10-P.
After testifying that the decedent had inherited
$21,000.00 from his brother (R.210-211), the following
and answers appear in the transcript (R. 212) beginning on line 2

Q. Did Mr. Hiltsley also have a sister who lived
in New Mexico?
A.
Yes.
Q. And did that sister die prior to the time of
your husband's death?
A.
About '80.
Q. And did she leave to Mr. Hiltsley a sum of
money?
A.
Yes.
Q. And how much money was that?
A.
Well, I can't--here again, I can't say just
what because my husband never told C1e very much.
But
as far as I can figure out, Etta, that is oy sister-in
law, when she came up to live with us, she was in and
out of the hospital quite a number of tiC1es 'cause she
had lung cancer and this time she was in the hospital
and I think my husband said that there was about four
or five thousands in debt.
Now, whether that came out
of the $20,000.00 that he inherited I don't know.
(Emphasis added)

-11The only other evidence on the matter is Exhibit P-10
where en page 253 the following notations are shown:
10/5/79 received money from Etta's account
transferred to Salt Lake from Albuquerque, N.M.-$30,000.00 plus 314--a shortage of $8.+The AH Savings will check the shortage for
me--placed $10,000.00 in savings passbook,
placed $10,000.00 in money market at AM
Savings,
$10,000.00 in money market @ PFS.
As stated above neither party introduced the above
testimony or exhibit for the purposes of showing how decedent
acquired the funds or what his obligations were regarding those
funds, or what ownership he had in the funds.

However, from

such scanty evidence, the court made the findings represented in
paragraph 24 of the Findings of Fact,

Findings)

referred to above.
Admittedly, presumptions form an important part of the
law of evidence generally.

However, defendant-appellant submits

that to presume or infer from such evidence as there is in this
case, as the trial court did, that (1) the decedent held $30,000
in trust for Etta Wood (R.89-92, Findings

and (2) the

$30,000.00 is traceable into the certificates and accounts in
question, is nothing more than manifest conjecture and
speculation.
A reading of the trial court's findings relative to
these matters only points out the uncertainty of the entire
decision.

-12Referring to Exhibit 4P, the money market certificate
American Savings, the trial court said:
Althou h no evidence at the trial was aiven tracin
t e istory o t e account, t e account, on Fe ruary
14, 1980 was shown as $12,000.00.
From Exhibit 10-P
it would appear that $10,000.00 from Etta Wood's
account received by decedent on October 5, 1979 was
placed in this American Savings account, and the
only inference that can be drawn is that the initial
$10,000.00 deposit came from Etta's transferred funds.
(R.92, Findings 1118). (Emphasis added)
In paragraph 18 of the trial court's Findings,

(R.92)

the court attempts to trace Exhibit 3P back to Etta Wood's func,
but, from the evidence can only trace it back to the opening

o:

account No. 715-100-837-3 opened February 22, 198G and closed
August 28, 1980 by withdrawal of $16,161.29.

Yet from the entr

on page 253 Exhibit lOP, upon which the courc bases its
findings, the deposit of $10,000.00 appears to have been made
"10/5/79".

There was no tracing of the account back to 10/5/79

No evidence was subnitted to show how $10,000.00 deposited on
10/5/79 had grown to $16,161.29 within a few months.

The tria'.

court, however, finds in paragraph 19 of the Findings (R.92)
that "Court finds that a substantial portion, if not all, of
Account No. 715-101422-2 (Ex.3P) is the Etta Wood original
$10,000.00 deposit and earnings thereon held as trustee for Et·
Wood."
The court has presumed from the entry on page 253 of
Exhibit lOP, that the decedent held Etta's monies for her in
trust.

It then presumes, on the basis of even less certain

-13evidence, that such monies were deposited into the accounts or
certificates before the court.
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the basic principle
that a presumption cannot be based upon a presumption as early
as 1916 in Denver

& R.G.R. Co. v. Ashton-Whyte-Skillicorn Co.,

49 Utah 82, 162 Pac. 83 (1916), wherein this Court held:
As the record now stands, however, the presumption of
defendant's negligence must be based upon another
presumption, namely that the cars were in the actual
control and management of the defendant when they
escaped.
This would result in basing one presumption
upon another which would be violation of an elementary
rule of evidence Id. at 85.
The same rule is well stated in Splinter v. City of Nampa, 74
Idaho 1, 10, 256 P. 2d 215, 220 (1953).
Circumstantial evidence is competent to establish
negligence and proximate cause.
Facts, which are
essential to a liability for negligence, may be inferred
upon circumstances which are established by evidence.
But, where circumstantial evidence is relied upon,
the circumstances must be proved, and not themselves
be left to presumption or inference. (Citation.) This
court has held that inference cannot be based upon
inference, nor presumption on presumption. (Citations.)
The underlying principle applicable here is that
a verdict cannot rest on conjecture; that where a party
seeks to establish a liability by circumstantial
evidence, he must establish circumstances of such
nature and so related to each other that his theory
of liability is the more reasonable conclusion to be
drawn therefrom, and that where the proven facts are
e uall consistent with the absence, as with the
existence, o neg igence on t e part o
e en ant,
the plaintiff has not carried the burden of proof
and cannot recover. (Citations.) (Emphasis added.)
A presumption or inference of fact must not be drawn
from premises which are uncertain, but must be founded on facts

-14established by direct evidence.

In this respect, this Court

held in Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 27 Utah 2d 419, 497 P. 2d
28 (1972) that:
(A) finding of causation cannot be predicated on mere
speculation or conjecture, and the matter must be
withdrawn from the jury's consideration, unless there
is evidence from which the inference may reasonably be
drawn that the injury suffered was caused by the
negligent act of the defendant. (Milligan v.
Furniture Co., 8 Utah 2d 383, 387, 335 P. 2d 61

0959).)

POINT II
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS
A MATTER OF LAW, ON ALL ISSUES.
A.

The Trial Court Erred in its Application of the Lai·.
as to Ownership of Joint Account During Lifetime.

The trial court found that the American Savings and Loa
Association savings account #1-048466 (Ex. 5-P) which had been
closed by decedent twenty-two (22) months before his death, was
an account held by tenants in common.

Further the trial court

determined that
.... the proceeds should be divided equitably between
the plaintiff and defendant as follows:
$10,000.00 to be held for the account of Etta Wood and
subject to probate of her estate; $16,150.68 allocated
to defendant as her contribution to the account;
$9,849.32 divided between the other tenants in common,
Ruth Hiltsley and deceased (sic defendant) each having
an interest of $4,924.66.
The balance of the account
$1,481.21, the deceased distributed in the manner
determined by him to be equitable. (R.90, Findings
H6(l)(d)).

The trial court apparently "bought" the argument of
plaintiff that once a tenant in common account was establish8c

-15the interest of one co-tenant could not be destroyed by the
action of the other co-tenant.

Said savings account was closed

by decedent on October 29, 1979, twenty-two months prior to his
death, by a withdrawal of the monies therein and used as part of
the down payment on the condominium purchased by the defendant
and decedent in their joint names. (R.90, Findings ,16(a)).
It is important to note, however, that although the
trial court made a finding that the account was a "tenancy in
common" account, and awarded plaintiff $4,924.66 (R.97) as her
share of the account, yet the court allowed the decedent to
distribute $1,481.21 of the account "in the manner determined by
him to equitable". (R. 91, Findings U6(d).
The law relative to ownership of a joint account during
the lifetime of the parties thereto is set forth in §75-6-103
(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which states:
A joint account belongs, during the lifetime
of all parties, to the parties in proportion to the
net contributions by each to the sums on deposit,
unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a
different intent.
§75-6-101 (6), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended,
defines net contribution as follows:
"Net contribution" of a party to a joint
account as of any given time is the sum of all
deposits to it made by or for him, less all
withdrawals made by or for him which have not
been paid to or applied to the use of any other
party, plus a prorata share of any interest or
dividends included in the current balance.
The
term includes, in addition, any proceeds of
deposit, life insurance added to the account by

-16reason of the death of the party whose net contribution is in question.
As regards the claim of the plaintiff that she had an
ownership interest in the account by virtue of the account beir.;
a "tenancy in common" account, which interest could not be
alienated by her husband during his lifetime, appellant refers
this court to the last two sentences of the Editorial Board
Comment following §75-6-103, wherein it is stated:
The theory of these sections is that the
basic relationship of the parties is that of
individual ownership of values attributable to
their respective deposits and withdrawals; the
right of survivorship which attaches unless
negated by the form of the account really is a
right to the values theretofore owned by another
which the survivor receives for the first time
at the death of the owner.
That is to say, the
account operates as a valid disposition at
death rather than as a present joint tenant.
It follows, therefore, that the decedent had the absolute right to withdraw the monies from said account for purpose'
satisfactory to him and the plaintiff had no interest in those
monies unless and until the decedent died leaving the account i'.
her joint name.
B.

Plaintiff-Respondent Offered No Evidence of The
Intent of The Decedent-Depositor in Creating Joint
Accounts.

The holdings of Utah cases such as McCullough v.
Wasserback, 30 U. 2d 398, 518 P. 2d 691 (1974) Pagano v. WalkeL
539 P. 2d 452 (U. 1975) and Spader v. Newbold, 29 U. 2d 453, 5;
P. 2d 153 (1973)

established rules regarding the ownership of

-17joint bank accounts upon the death of the depositor.

To the

extent that those rules relate to actions against the estate of
the decedent, they have now been codified in §75-6-104 (1) Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as aoended where it provides as follows:
Sums remaining on deposit at the death of
a party to a joint account belong to the surviving
party or parties as against the estate of the
decedent unless there is clear and convincing
evidence of a different intention at the time
the account is created.
The plaintiff alleged no claim in her pleadings and
offered no evidence at trial of a different

on the

part of the deceased than to have the surviving joint tenant
have the funds in the certificates.

In fact, the Will of the

decedent executed August 9, 1978 (Ex.6P) offered by plaintiff
states:
Thirdly. I direct all savings certificates,
savings accounts and checking accounts held jointly by
myself and another, shall become the sole property
of such surviving co-signer.
C.

Plaintiff-Respondent's Allegations of Fraud,
Alienation of Affections and Undue Influence are
Not Supported by the Evidence.

The plaintiff rested her case on the theory that she was
entitled to the certificates in issue because of the allegations
of fraud, alienation of affections and undue influence made by
her.
The trial court correctly made findings of fact contrary
to such allegations:

-189.
Other than the Will preparation and the
manner in which deceased handled his findings,
plaintiff did not produce evidence of alienation
of her husband's affections for her. (R.88)
10. Court is unable to determine why the deceasec
favored defendant over plaintiff on the financial
transactions described herein ... (R.88)
25. As to the claims for relief made by the
plaintiff, the evidence does not establish the
essential elements of fraud in this case.
Nor
does the Court find evidence of willful and
malicious conduct on the part of defendant such
as would support the claim for punitive damages. (R.941
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is submitted that the Cour·
had no power to render judgment in favor of a non-party to th€
litigation and that such judgment is null and void; that in an
event, the evidence to support a finding of the Court that the
decedent held monies in trust for said non-party is based upon
insufficient and speculative evidence; that the plaintiff has
failed to bear her burden of proving a different intent on the
part of decedent in establishing the accounts than that the
surviving tenant should own the certificates; that plaintiff h;
failed to prove any other ground for awarding the accounts to
her as against the defendant.

Based upon the foregoing,

the

Judgment of the trial court should be reversed and defendant
awarded the funds in the certificates at American Savings and
Loan Association account #ll-613277-9(Ex.4P) and Prudential
Federal Savings and Loan Association account

-19#715-101,422-2(Ex.3P), as the sole surviving joint tenant to
said certificates, and the judgment in favor of plaintiff in the
amount of $4,924.26 should be reversed as well as the Order
requiring the

to pay amounts to the personal

representative of Etta Wood.

Respectfully submitted,

McKAY, BURTON, THURMAN & CONDIE

Dated September 2, 1983.
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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